There is growing interest by investors to "do the right thing" by using their influence to pressure companies to improve their approach to environmental, social and governance (ESG) issues. But a major challenge is how to minimize the potential costs imposed by ESG constraints on portfolios and overcome the persistent sparsity of ESG data resulting from companies' non-reporting. In this study, we propose a quantitative approach to integrating ESG into portfolios that is expected to deliver comparable performance to non-ESG portfolios and is capable of classifying companies based on ESG even when they do not disclose sufficient data. The approach is particularly suitable for quantitative portfolios with large numbers of positions and many small exposures. In such portfolios, one can generally identify companies with bad ESG metrics and swap them out for companies with similar expected future returns and better ESG scores. This allows the manager to efficiently tilt the entire portfolio towards better ESG companies without the need to employ detailed ESG analysis of individual firms.
Introduction
Even as the popularity of ESG investing has grown, investors have continued to struggle with an essential challenge: incorporating ESG factors into portfolio construction. Adding ESG considerations typically means that the universe of investment candidates becomes more restricted or that additional restraints are placed on the portfolios. In either case, short-term returns may suffer.
Our extensive literature review convincingly shows that firms with better ESG scores tend to have a lower cost of capital and enjoy higher valuations than firms with inferior ESG scores.
1 This suggests that firms with better ESG metrics should be expected to experience lower future returns. However, while some studies document lower future returns for better ESG firms, some show higher returns, and still others demonstrate no meaningful difference. A major shortcoming of all these studies, however, is that because ESG disclosures are voluntary, data is frequently incomplete due to non-reporting. In addition, a lack of uniform standards hinders comparability across companies, and low correlations among data vendors' company ratings adds more noise, further hampering the portfolio construction process.
To address these issues, we first leverage recent work by the Sustainability Accounting Standards Board (SASB) and suggest an approach using material ESG items. Second, we propose a new ESG factor-loading methodology that expands the universe to non-reporting companies. Using our innovative ESG approach, we find that companies with better ESG scores have higher valuations but similar returns to those with poor ESG scores.
Plotting ESG Data on the Materiality Map
Our first task was to establish a numeric framework for ESG issues to allow meaningful comparisons across firms. SASB has created a Materiality Map™ that maps 30 ESG issues to 79 industries based on evaluations by analysts specialized in each industry. Utilizing this industry-specific materiality map, we first mapped each of SASB's 30 material items to one or more of 52 Bloomberg raw data items and aligned each of the 79 industries with one of the 157 MSCI GICS sub-industries.
We then created a numeric sub-score for each ESG data item. For items consisting of a "Yes" or "No" response corresponding to a positive or negative ESG impact, we assigned +1 or -1, reversing the score to -1 or +1 when "Yes" was a negative (such as a product recall). For unscaled numeric metrics such as carbon emissions, we manually scaled them by market capitalization. We then ranked all scaled numeric items into two groups -above and below median -and again assigned a +1 and -1 sub-score, reversing the score if the item was negative (such as above-median emissions).
This mapping and scoring system allowed us to classify a firm as having good ESG metrics (with at least six material items and at least 50% being positive) or bad ESG metrics (with at least six material items but fewer than 20% being positive), with the rest classified as either neutral or missing. To determine the benefit of using the SASB materiality mapping, we then followed the same classification procedure using not only the material items but all disclosed ESG items.
ESG Scores and Future Returns
We analyzed the Bloomberg ESG data from December 2008 through December 2015 for Russell 3000 ® and S&P 500 companies. ESG scores were constructed for December of each year (e.g., 12/2009), using data identified from the previous year (e.g., 2008), while stock performance was examined for the following year (e.g., 2010). For stock returns, we used the CRSP database, using the buy-and-hold return on stocks from January through December minus the buy-and-hold return of similar stocks in terms of size, book-to-market ratio and momentum.
As shown in Table 1 , for the Russell ® universe we had over 23,000 annual observations of market values and subsequent returns for the eight years we studied. Strikingly, though, only 7,766, or roughly a third, were from companies reporting six or more material ESG items. The average company reported fewer than two material ESG items. As for the S&P universe, we observed better ESG data availability, with the average company reporting over four material items and almost 80% reporting at least one material item. Both the Russell 3000 ® and S&P 500 had about four times more ESG than material ESG items. Table 2 demonstrates the average annual excess return for firms with metrics classified as good, bad, neutral or missing according to both the material ESG items and all items. Interestingly, the companies with good metrics according to material items showed a strong tendency to outperform the bad, with an average excess return of 1.7% (vs. -1.4% for companies with bad metrics), although a subsequent t-test did not reveal statistical significance. It's important to note that our classification of good and bad ESG firms according to the material items resulted in a very small percentage of the population, about 1.4% and 2%, respectively. This confirmed the need for expansion of the classification to non-reporting firms. Past performance is not a guarantee or a reliable indicator of future results. All investments involve risk, including the possible loss of capital.
A very different picture emerged when we classified companies using all available ESG items. The companies with good ESG metrics had a tendency to underperform the bad, with excess returns of 3.8% and 4.6%, respectively, although statistical significance was not reached. Similar results were found in S&P 500 (i.e., just the largest) companies. When material items were used, companies with good metrics outperformed the bad (1.3% vs. -.1% bps), and when all ESG items were used, companies with bad metrics outperformed good ones (4.5% vs. 3.5%).
Expanding the ESG Classification
To expand the ESG classifications to non-reporting Russell 3000 ® companies, we followed a procedure similar to the one used in pairs trading. We first created for each December a Good Minus Bad (GMB) ESG factor, which is the value-weighted return of the companies with good ESG metrics, according to the SASB material items, minus the value-weighted return of the companies with bad ESG metrics. We then ran an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression of the monthly returns of both reporting and non-reporting companies on the five Fama-French factors plus the GMB ESG factor over the previous five years. Firms with positive loadings on the GMB ESG factor were considered good, and firms with negative loadings were considered bad.
As shown in Table 3 , our method allowed for an increase of 240% (from 625 to 2,131) in the number of companies with good ESG metrics and an increase of 206% (from 510 to 1,561) in the number with bad ones. In addition, in the expanded universe, firms with positive loadings on GMB indeed showed a higher average ESG score (0.34) than those with negative loadings (0.26), and the difference was statistically significant (p=0.0001). This further corroborated our new ESG expansion methodology. When the annual excess return was analyzed, the expanded universe of companies with good ESG metrics outperformed the expanded universe with bad metrics by close to six percentage points (2.7% to -3.2%), and the difference was statistically significant (p=0.0021). Nevertheless, when the returns of the good and bad ESG companies were analyzed on an annual basis, we found that more variation existed, with the bad actually outperforming in four of the eight years. Thus, although we show statistically better performance of good ESG firms during the entire period, practically speaking, we should probably think of the two groups as having equivalent returns. Still, these results show the benefit of using the expanded ESG universe.
In addition, Table 3 shows an average book-to-market ratio of 0.79 for companies with good ESG metrics and 1.43 for bad, confirming previous findings that companies with good ESG metrics enjoy higher valuations (M/B ratios). If current valuations of the good ESG firms are higher, why do they not have lower future excess returns?
To address this counterintuitive finding, we analyzed the future valuations and implied rates of return by some of the most informed investors -sell-side research analysts. The ratio of book value per share to average target price (from IBES) showed an average of 0.84 for bad ESG firms and 0.61 for good ESG firms, indicating that analysts expected a higher future valuation on the good firms. Meanwhile, the average implied rate of return (12-month target price divided by current price) was higher for bad firms than good firms at 33% and 21%, but this difference was not statistically significant (p=0.1642). Thus, while security analysts price firms with good ESG metrics at higher valuations than bad ones, they seem to misprice their future returns somewhat by expecting those higher valuations to continue.
Conclusions
This study provides two major contributions to the efforts to integrate ESG into portfolio construction. We provide evidence that using only material ESG items in each industry is preferable to using all disclosed ESG items. We further show that it is possible to expand the classification of non-ESG-reporting firms into good and bad ESG groups using our innovative GMB ESG factor. This expansion allows us to increase the number of good and bad companies by over 200% while preserving the characteristics and return patterns of the original good and bad ESG firms. Using our ESG approach, we find that companies with better ESG scores have similar returns to those with poor ESG scores, suggesting it should be possible to systematically tilt a portfolio toward better-scoring companies without detracting from performance. As quantitative investment processes are likely the most efficient at incorporating sparse ESG data, our study provides an innovative and potentially powerful approach for quant investors to do well through doing good.
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